Machinist vs. Mismanagement at Eastern Airlines by Baicich, Paul J.
Labor Research Review 
Volume 1 | Number 10 




Machinist vs. Mismanagement at Eastern Airlines 
Paul J. Baicich 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Labor Research Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please 
contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
© 1987 by Labor Research Review 
Machinist vs. Mismanagement at Eastern Airlines 
Abstract 
IAM 100 leaders interviewed by Paul J. Baicich. 
Keywords 
Eastern Airlines, Air Line Pilots Association, Transport Workers Union, IAM 






at Eastern Airlines 
*IAM 100 Leaders Interviewed 
by Paul J. Baicich 
Mismanagement has been raised to a high art at Eastern Airlines. 
Since 1983, Fortune magazine has conducted a survey measuring 
the "most and least admired" corporations. Eastern Airlines (EAL) 
has consistently been among the "least admired'—near the bottom 
oi Fortune's list in such categories as "innovativeness," "quality 
of management," "ability to attract, develop and keep talented 
people," and "use of corporate assets." Clearly, something has been 
wrong at EAL. And, union members there tried to do something 
about it. 
Eastern is a company which for the last few years has had 
increasing passenger loads and growing revenues. Yet management 
has consistently maintained that it could only make ends meet 
if employees gave up wages and benefits. As a result, management 
has put enormous pressure on the workers—union and non-union 
alike—to make concessions. Indeed, these same management 
complaints against labor costs have been heard throughout the 
airline industry. This industry-wide chorus—accompanied by the 
onslaught of deregulation and new, non-union carriers—continues 
while mergers in the industry proceed apace. 
• Paul]. Baicich works at Washington National Airport and is recording secretary 
of IAM Local Lodge 796. 
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By and large, one airline union after another has given into the 
demands for concessions, but the scene at Eastern produced a new 
twist. Rather than simply give up wages and benefits, unionists 
questioned management's priorities in squeezing wages to create 
savings. Instead, they insisted on searching elsewhere in the 
corporation for real waste. District 100 of the Machinists took the 
lead at EAL, and they were followed by the other two unions on 
the property—the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), representing 
the pilots, and the Transport Workers Union (TWU), representing 
flight attendants. 
The crucial event in this story was the EAL bankruptcy scare 
of late 1983 and its outcome. Machinists agreed to an 18% cut 
in wages for one year in exchange for stock ownership and a say 
in running the airline. This contract approach was pioneered by 
the IAM, and ALPA and TWU made parallel arrangements. (See 
Labor Research Review No.'s 4 and 5 for background on the 
struggles that preceded this agreement and for a debate on the 
pros and cons of the Machinists' contract.) 
Among the tenets of the IAM-EAL agreement, which the union 
called "Programs for Positive Action," were a number of items that 
enabled the union to address the issue of mismanagement. Some 
of them were: 
• A union right to review and approve the company's business 
plan. The business plan for 1984, an outline of Eastern's goals 
for the year, was somewhat revised with the intention of 
identifying non-essential and potentially wasteful expenditures. 
This union right was for one year only. 
• Unlimited access to all company financial information. This 
valuable tool provided union access to details concerning the 
company's condition and finances. The company made this 
information available, both voluntarily and upon request, at least 
until mid-1985. 
• A right to participate in the design of new facilities and in 
redesigning existing ones. This created a union right to address 
poorly conceived facilities, but at most stations management 
behaved as if this proviso had never been agreed upon. 
• A seat on the Board of Directors. Union representation on the 
Board provided official, public recognition of the company's 
agreement to allow union participation in decision-making. It 
increased union knowledge of the company's plans and its ability 
to react to them. On the downside, it forced the Board's 
Executive Committee to make important decisions without the 
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full knowledge of the entire body, thereby excluding the employee 
representatives. It also created situations where union represen-
tatives were prevented from making public the discussions and 
decisions of the Board. 
• A revision of lead/supervisory responsibilities. In order to reduce 
the number of supervisors, there was an effort to confer more 
responsibility, accountability and decision-making on the 
unionized "lead worker" on each workcrew. At locations where 
the union structure and traditions were strong, the IAM was able 
to take advantage of this provision. 
• The creation of an ''employee involvement" program. This was 
a QWL-type operation with all its attendant risks. It was most 
successful when it worked in tandem with the following item. 
• A policy of "contracting-in" work. The major thrust of this 
important policy was the union desire to bring additional work 
in-house, leading toward more job security for the unionists at 
EAL as well as savings for the company. 
Exactly when this process of experimentation came to an end 
is up for debate. Some union activists maintain that it was over 
on January 1, 1985, when management refused to let the 18% 
wage cut "snap back" to negotiated levels. While the company 
was forced to relent on this particular issue, the unilateral holding 
of wages clearly had poisoned the atmosphere at Eastern. Much 
of the workers' momentum toward correcting company 
mismanagement collapsed after January 1985. 
Choosing another date for collapse of cooperation, Charles 
Bryan, the President and General Chairman of IAM District 100, 
maintains that the "idea we had of developing complete trust 
between labor and management with a culture of co-determination 
ended with total betrayal by corporate power brokers in the night 
of February 23, 1986." That night the Board of Directors, over the 
objections of employee representatives, sold EAL to Texas Air 
Corporation. Texas Air is run by Frank Lorenzo, the airline 
industry's No. 1 union-buster. 
Despite highly irregular procedures, union charges of insider 
trading, and union attempts to make a counter-offer to buy Eastern 
through a leveraged ESOP, the deal with Texas Air was sealed at 
a sham stockholders' meeting in late November 1986. On 
November 27, 1986, "Eastern Airlines" disappeared from the New 
York Stock Exchange. It is now part of Texas Air. 
Whether one accepts the January 1985 date or the February 1986 
one as marking the demise of the Eastern experiment, the ways 
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the IAM addressed the issues of mismanagement are instructive. 
Indeed, there were even adjustments and alternate plans ham-
mered out between those two dates which illustrated the union's 
willingness to continue to address mismanagement. High on that 
list was the Efficiency Credit Team (ECT) concept, which was 
agreed upon in the revised IAM-EAL contract in Spring 1985. 
The ECT was designed to have the union identify and imple-
ment expense reductions and productivity ideas at the workplace 
in exchange for wage raises. The IAM was eager to engage in this 
plan because it had been so successful in previous "contracting-
in" and waste-finding projects. The problem was that by now 
management had caught on and was reluctant to give the IAM 
credit for savings found. Management fought crediting the union 
for cost-saving ideas at every turn, and this policy was altered in 
late 1985, allowing for minor wage increases regardless of the ECT 
crediting. 
Some critics of this entire approach have maintained that the 
union has no business interfering in what have been considered 
management prerogatives. Others maintain that getting bogged 
down in these affairs diverts union energies and talent away from 
activities which address root causes of labor's decline in the air 
transport industry—efforts like organizing the unorganized in old 
as well as new carriers, forming patterns of solidarity and coor-
dinated bargaining among the varied unions, keeping a strong 
focus on reasserting unionized industry standards, and launching 
a political campaign over our national transportation policy (in-
cluding the issue of re-regulation). 
Nonetheless, IAM District 100 at Eastern must have done 
something right. While wages and benefits at other carriers were 
often standing still or dropping, District 100 was able by mid-1986 
to deliver the industry's highest or near-highest wages. Granted, 
this did not prevent EAL's takeover by union-busting Texas Air 
Corporation. But the IAM experience at EAL between January 
1984 and February 1986 produced numerous important ex-
periments in checking mismanagement. 
The impact and significance of these experiments was the sub-
ject of a Labor Research Review interview with the following IAM 
100 leaders: Charles Bryan, president and general chairman; Russ 
McGarry, vice-president and general chairman; Chuck Conner, 
directing coordinator of the Efficiency Credit Team (ECT); and Joe 
Imperatori, Local 702 shop steward and ECT coordinator. 
—Paul J. Baicich 
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LRR: Is there anything left of the Machinists' "Programs for 
Positive Action" at Eastern? 
Bryan: The entire program remains, as it relates to being in the 
contract and still being officially in force. But by contrast to it being 
100% in effect technically by contract, it's 0% in effect as far as 
being accepted or honored by the current management. It's 
essentially defunct as it relates to the current management, and 
it really started to be ignored by the company in about September 
1985, when it was obvious the company was being geared up for 
the Texas Air take-over. 
LRR: One of the key Programs was designed to give union "lead 
workers" responsibilities previously reserved for management. 
Why was this important to the union, and how well did it work? 
McGarry: We felt the union had lost a lot of its leverage because 
the leads in years past had been the experienced people that kind 
of brought along the people under them, almost through a type 
of apprentice program. People were able to be taught by the people 
from within the bargaining unit. Over a period of time, the leads 
were programmed by management to disassociate themselves 
from the people—we found that to be the case. And what you had 
then was an increased amount of supervision and you had the 
leads like middle-men, who were basically signing time-cards and 
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not allowed to assign people their work and also not allowed to 
provide training. 
So all the training and all the assignments and all the close work 
that would be done normally within the bargaining unit was being 
done by supervision. We got into the mode where we found we 
had one supervisor for every 4.6 people, which was totally 
ridiculous. 
We looked back and talked to a lot of the older leads and 
interviewed people at different stations and everybody said, 
"There's no respect from management for the lead because they 
have taken his responsibilities and there's no respect from the 
people because they know he isn't allowed to do anything." 
So, we thought we would try as a way of cutting down on the 
supervision—it wasn't so much to give the lead more responsibility, 
but to give him more respect and bring him back to where he was 
leading, directing and working with the people. That was the goal. 
LRR: How well do you think it worked? 
McGarry: Well, it worked better in maintenance than it did in 
ramp service. Mainly because the middle-management in 
maintenance at the time was more receptive and less apprehensive 
about their jobs. What we found in ramp service was that right 
away management perceived it as us trying to take their jobs. 
Which was a foolish assumption because it doomed the program 
to failure before it had a chance to really begin. 
We had proven to the company that the IAM could save dollars 
and be efficient. But management never seemd to grasp the 
concept, and now management seems to be turning around and 
saying to the leads, "Well, we're going to give you all the respon-
sibilities. We're not going to give management anything. And if 
the operation proves inefficient, you will be responsible for it and 
you will be disciplined for it." 
LRR: So they're turning it back on the union at this point? 
McGarry: Exactly. Management has brought in union-busting 
attorneys and, in the fashion of corporate America's thinking 
today, seem intent on crushing organized labor instead of allowing 
worker co-determination as our major competitors in Germany 
and Japan are doing. Those countries, by the way, are heavily 
unionized. 
LRR: How was the "employee involvement" program structured? 
During its brief life, was it a success or a failure? 
McGarry: First of all, I really was not heavily involved with the 
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employee involvement (EI) program when it first started out. I kind 
of picked up on it in the middle. I got involved after we had had 
some problems with quality circles (before the 1983 contract), 
where management was using it as an anti-union tool. 
So we started to develop our own program. We were trying to 
convince the people that if the union used EI towards its goals 
of collective action, more communication, more action within the 
union itself, that we could become stronger, but we could also 
better the way of life of our membership by creating a safer 
environment and improving the quality of worklife, with better 
benefits for all of us. That might have been rather idealistic, but 
that's really what we were working toward^—the "co-deter-
mination" type of thing that we gave Japan and Germany after 
World War II. 
LRR: The "employee involvement" program as such came after 
the quality circles business and was part of the 1983 Programs 
for Positive Action. And that's when you got involved? 
McGarry: Right. As I said before, we tried to restructure it and 
tried to take out the anti-union provisions. And there, once again, 
I honestly believe that the thing that hurt us the most was that 
the middle management never bought into it. You had the lower 
people on the floor who really cared that they worked in a safer 
environment and were trying. You had the leadership saying we're 
behind it. But you didn't have enough mules out there to pull the 
wagon anywhere. 
Sometimes we separate ourselves into levels where we get away 
from the floor. European unions have been successful in keeping 
their presence on the floor where people see it at all levels, and 
they feel a close assimilation to it. I think we've lost some of that, 
and I don't know how we're going to get it back in a hurry. 
LRR: During 1984, the Contracting-In Committee found many 
jobs being contracted out that could be done at lower cost by union 
members in-house. Under the union contract, how were you able 
to force management to bring those jobs in-house? Did you have 
to prove that they could be done less expensively? 
Conner: Let me give you some background on that. One of the 
reasons this whole contracting committee got established was 
because, as you know, the company kept coming to the union 
asking for concessions because they weren't making any money. 
And Charlie [Bryan] kept telling Frank Borman [then Eastern 
CEO], "We hate to keep financing mismanagement." Apparently 
over a period of years Borman decided to take him up on it, and 
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• Machinists Saved 
• Stephen B. Abrecht 
In December 1983 the Machinists at Eastern Airlines agreed to 
a contract which stipulated, among other things, that in 1984 the 
union would work with management to identify and implement 
$22 million in cost savings that did not affect pay rates and benefit 
levels. 
It was no secret that Eastern was riddled with inefficiencies, 
many of them in maintenance and ramp service where Machinists 
could directly observe them. Mechanics could reel off a litany of 
costly company policies and practices, many of them stemming 
from years of management obsession with fighting its unionized 
workforce. 
The union and management established the following ground 
rules for the Cost Savings Program: 
1) The union appointed four members full-time to implement 
the program, with all costs being borne by the company. 
2) The union had complete access to inside information, 
including budgets, inventory records, supplier contracts and 
engineering orders, to enable it to identify and cost out individual 
projects. 
3) Management had to cooperate fully in costing out and 
implementing projects, and any project that proved economically 
feasible had to be implemented. 
4) Any capital investment required by a project had to be 
recovered within the first year. 
5) The target of $22 million for 1984 was not binding, and there 
was no financial penalty or benefit to the union if it fell short or 
exceeded the target. 
By management's own accounting, the program more than met 
its 1984 target, saving $26 million for the company in one year. 
This amounted to more than a 5% reduction in labor costs without 
reducing any union member's standard of living. 
The initial Cost Savings Program ended January 1, 1985, but the 
union continued its cost saving efforts and eventually negotiated 
a new program, called the Efficiency Credit Team (ECT). ECT put 
the savings directly into the I AM wage base, and for this and other 
reasons the company stalled, delayed and eventually destroyed the 
program, as management went back to fighting the union at every 
step. 
During the approximately one and a half years that one or the 
$137 Million at Eastern 
other of these programs was active, the union saved the company 
$53 million on an annualized basis. Many of these savings recur 
year after year, meaning that from January 1984 to January 1987 
the union provided a total of $137 million in cost savings. 
These cost savings were achieved basically in the following five 
areas: 
• Contracting-In: Parts repairs, component overhaul, facility 
cleaning, and printing were some of the major functions that were 
brought back in-house. At all major airlines certain specialized or 
unusual repairs are performed by outside contractors, but at 
Eastern contracting-out had become a management labor relations 
policy to fight the union. 
• Repair versus Replace: An expedient but costly policy which 
had mushroomed in previous years was to replace a used or broken 
part with a new one rather than service the old one. From manage-
ment's narrow perspective, this policy provided the double 
"benefit" of ease in writing a check to a supplier rather than 
managing the job in-house, while cutting down on the number of 
unionized employees. The real expense to the company developed 
gradually and invisibly. Besides the excessive cost of each 
individual replacement, the company had developed rooms full 
of serviceable excess bolts, brakes and other parts. Because these 
parts were never repaired and put back in inventory, they remained 
invisible to the upper levels of management who monitored the 
company's performance through reams of inaccurate computer 
printouts. 
• Manufacture versus Purchase: Similar to repair versus 
replace, management often overlooked the in-house labor skills 
and tooling capabilities for manufacturing their own parts. 
• Rebid Supplier Contracts: Stock clerks looked into the prices 
charged by suppliers for many of the thousands of parts purchased 
by Eastern. Checks with local hardware stores or friendly clerks 
at other airlines uncovered excessive prices. One project dealt with 
a small air-conditioning filter for which Eastern was being charged 
$5 a piece. From a local supplier the IAM procured the identical 
part for 3 cents a piece. 
• Labor Force Reductions: These reductions were agreed upon 
jointly by union and management and were achieved through 
attrition and cuts in planned new hiring. 
• Stephen B. Abrecht is executive director of Abrecht Associates, Inc., a research 
and consulting firm for labor unions. He has been working with IAM District 
100 since 1982. 
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have us prove it to the company that they were mismanaging. 
So, they got together Buddy Sugg [chair of the Combined Shop 
Committee at the Miami Base] and EAL's director of labor relations 
to kick some of the walls down that they'd built up over the years 
to farm our jobs out. When they did that, Joe Imperatori and 
myself volunteered to be part of it because we had both seen such 
waste at Eastern we thought we could help. 
The company and the union laid some guidelines down. Like 
the cost to Eastern for a fully allocated mechanic. If you were going 
to determine how much a job was going to cost to bring in-house, 
you have to determine how long it's going to take a mechanic at 
Eastern to do it. We agreed to a $45-an-hour flat minimum rate 
for a fully allocated mechanic. This includes his insurance, 
benefits, everything he had going in addition to his salary, plus 
part of the supervisor's salary, the overhead for your lights, stuff 
of that nature. So, if we were going to look at a job, and we 
determined we could do it in three hours, we'd multiply that times 
$45, plus the price of the materials, and then we'd compare that 
to what the outside vendor was charging us. If we could show 
it was cheaper to bring it in-house, they were obligated to bring 
it in. 
And then there was like a trial period, where after three or four 
months the supervisor and division comptroller reviewed the 
project to determine if the project was working out the way we 
thought it would. If not, then they could ship it back out again. 
But that never happened. Out of all those hundreds of projects, 
they never found one where they had to ship it back out. And 
in most cases, it saved them more money—we were very 
conservative—than we initially put down. 
LRR: In mid-1985, the Contracting-In Committee was replaced 
by the Efficiency Credit Team (ECT). Why was this change made, 
and how was the ECT different from the Contracting-In effort? 
Conner: It evolved from the Contracting-In Committee, which 
was more of an informal situation, to a contractual item. It was 
Charlie's vehicle to help Eastern recoup some of their losses and 
for us to recoup some of our salary through saving money for the 
company. Charlie saw the potential of a lot of waste we were 
identifying, and he thought it would be good for the company and 
the IAM to formalize this into a contract. 
Imperatori: Basically, it was to recoup our wages. By us looking 
at waste and cost savings, the membership would recoup their 
wages. Under the Contracting-In Committee, we were not 
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recouping our wages. 
Conner: In the Contracting-In Committee, the savings were all 
gratis to the company. 
LRR: The company is ignoring the ECT now, isn't it? Does the 
ECT still exist? 
Conner: Yes. We had sitting on the comptroller's desk for the last 
six or eight months about $3 million worth of cost-saving 
suggestions. The comptroller was busy with the take-over and the 
new '87 business plan and all, but we just got a letter from him 
and they accepted every one of the suggestions. As of this moment, 
we just gave them another $3 million gratis. 
Imperatori: Yeah, we're not getting one penny back for that cost 
saving. 
Conner: And even though we're giving them these cost-saving 
ideas, I've got a half dozen grievances against the company because 
they're violating the contract on ECT as far as giving us informa-
tion to help us save them money. They refuse us any information 
whatsoever. They've thrown us [the ECT] off the property (our 
office is now at the local lodge), they refuse us any information, 
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and they've told everyone in management not to talk to us—and 
yet we're still saving them millions of dollars. 
LRR: According to union researcher Steve Abrecht, these two 
efforts found some $137 million in cost savings over three years. 
Can you give some examples of the sorts of things that saved that 
kind of money? 
Imperatori: The first project I got involved in was the heat shields. 
What was happening was: as the heat shields were taken off the 
liners, instead of repairing them, they were scrapping them. They 
were purchasing new ones at a cost of about $350 a piece. And 
each liner carried 36-a-piece heat shields, which you're talking 
big bucks. Over a year, you were talking in the neighborhood of 
about $650,000 savings to the company, because we were able to 
repair them for about $20 or $25 a piece. 
Conner: First stage turbine vanes on a JT8 engine, which is on 
your 727 and D-9 aircraft. We were for a long time doing repairs 
on them in-house, and for some reason over a period of years, we 
quit doing them. We were just scrapping them, instead of 
overhauling them. And then for a long period of time, we were 
sending them out to a vendor to get them overhauled. When I 
started looking into that, it turned out we could do the p rocess -
cause we had most of the tooling and expertise in-house still—for 
a minimum cost. So we brought them back in-house, and did the 
welding, cutting, the stripping and the new plating, and we were 
saving ourselves a little over $319,000 a year. That's an example 
of one of the very first projects I did. 
Imperatori: There was another project I was involved with. What 
was happening was that on one of the inner flanges of the outer 
cases on the A300 engines, it was always getting cracked. Under 
the repair, it called for a titanium fixture for welding this particular 
case. The fixture cost $11,000 a piece. So, I got together with the 
Engineering, and we tried to get around not taking it into heat-
treating after welding—in other words, doing a green weld, where 
you weld it and you don't heat treat it. By doing it that way, we 
eliminated all the heat-treating fixtures. Like you're talking about 
another $50,000. 
But General Electric was charging us $7,000 for welding one 
weld on each case. When I finally got Engineering to waive the 
heat treat, then I looked at another case that we had that we were 
using another ring for welding the cracks. I got the machine shop 
[at Eastern] to make a fixture for that particular case. By doing 
that, we brought in the cases, and we're welding them at a cost 
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of about $500 a case, compared to what GE was charging us, which 
was $7,000. 
Conner: Eastern management was amazed at what we did—just 
a few of us, just three mechanics and a stock chaser and the 
director of labor relations from Eastern. They were very surprised 
that we could do that much. So they put together their own group 
of people—professional engineers, a man from the purchasing 
department, a man from inventory management—and put them 
up in a room there and gave them the name of Material Value 
Analysis Group. Their charge was to do exactly what we had been 
doing for almost a year. 
LRR: So this was a professional rival operation from manage-
ment's side? 
Conner: Absolutely. We weren't told about it or nothing. The first 
thing we found out about it, they had bulletins all over saying that 
if you've got cost-saving ideas, call this number. 
So, guess what? After about three or four months, they weren't 
making enough cost savings to justify their salaries, much less 
getting the millions of dollars of savings. So, they started coming 
to us, asking if we would throw some jobs their way so they could 
look good. 
And at the same time, they started going down on the floor and 
trying to rob the ideas from our membership and take credit for 
it. So, Joe and I kind of froze them out by passing the word down 
there that if you tell those guys the information, we won't get credit 
for it. So we got our guys to quit talking to them mostly—to the 
point that the manager of that group came to me and made me 
an offer that if we'd blend the two committees together, he would 
subordinate himself to the director of our committee and his group 
would take orders from us, just so they could stay in existence. 
At the time Charlie was negotiating the ECT in the contract, 
so he wasn't interested in that. So they finally went by the wayside, 
and they never made enough to justify their monthly salaries. 
LRR: How many jobs do you figure these programs created or 
saved? 
Conner: We never evaluated that. It would be a hard one to figure 
out. I'm sure it kept mechanics from being laid off. It definitely 
gave job security against the potential for a lay-off. But I really 
don't know how you'd put a number on that. 
LRR: Cutting operating costs is usually a management function, 
and often comes down to a "speed-up" of one sort or another. Did 
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you ever get the sense that the ECT was becoming too committed 
to reducing costs, to the possible detriment of working conditions? 
Did you experience any conflict in your roles as cost-cutters and 
unionists? 
Conner: We didn't evaluate jobs so much for ergonomics or their 
work habits. What we did basically was evaluate the jobs that 
outside vendors were doing versus what we could do in-house— 
not the jobs that were already in-house and how they were doing 
it, to see if they could do it any better. We never really got involved 
in that. 
We did get into standard practice and policies and procedures 
of how Eastern was managing the company inside, as we got more 
proficient. Such as how they were storing inventory. We found 
out they were losing millions of dollars in inventory management 
procedures. We wrote volumes of how they were mismanaging 
their inventory—losing it, double-charging it—and they corrected 
all that and we got credit for several million dollars on that. 
But to answer your question: No, I don't think we lost sight of 
what we were doing to the point where we jeopardized either 
safety or increased the speed of the individual working. We didn't 
get involved in that aspect of it. 
LRR: Charlie Bryan, you were on Eastern's Board of Directors 
for almost three years. How did that go? Were you able to fully 
participate in the Board's discussions and decisions? Or did other 
board members keep information from you and make decisions 
in the Executive Committee? 
Bryan: In the beginning, the directors were very respectful. They 
seemed to express considerable respect for the input I contributed 
to the board. But every time there was a crisis, of course, they 
supported their chairman, Frank Borman. 
At the end of 1984, for example, I requested an emergency board 
meeting to discuss Borman's violating the labor contract by 
reneging on the commitment to restore the 18% wage cut on 
January 1, 1985. The board meeting took place within five days, 
which I thought was very responsive. By the same token, when 
that board did get together, they were unanimously in support 
of Frank Borman's action of violating the contract. So while they 
were very respectful about calling the meeting, they consistently 
supported their chairman. There was no deviation from that 
pattern. 
LRR: What kinds of conflicts did you experience between being 
a stockholder representative and a worker representative? Were 
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you ever concerned that you might get so wrapped up in Eastern's 
fate as an ongoing business that you'd lose your identity as a 
unionist? 
Bryan: No, in no respect. And clearly the board didn't think that 
either. Because we had some very heated discussions on the board. 
It was absolutely clear to the board that I never took off my union 
hat. They would say, "Now take off your union hat and put on 
your board-of-directors hat." People frequently would say that. But 
I made it clear to them that my union hat was permanently on. 
LRR: Were you able to raise mismanagement as a problem the 
Board should be addressing? 
Bryan: Not only did I raise it, I made detailed written reports to 
the board on it. When I was first on the board, I noticed the first 
meeting or two that nothing I said was in any way reflected in 
the minutes. After I realized this, I started a practice of making 
detailed, typewritten reports and distributing one to every board 
member so there could not be any escape of the fact that it was 
reported to them my observations and my opinions about 
mismanagement. 
LRR: You also raised, in some of the memos, questions such as 
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pilot shortages and other items like that? 
Bryan: Yes, a whole range of things. In fact, there was a report 
I put into the board in September of 1986 about the mismanage-
ment, and in that I made a reference to the pilot shortage and the 
fact that it was so inexcusable because it was a repeat of something 
that had happened with the same management in a Harvard case 
study of 1973. The case study had specifically named Borman, 
who was then vice president of operations; and the same guy that's 
now in planning, Dave Kunstler, was vice president of planning 
back at that time. They had actually gone through identically the 
same thing. They'd depended on getting some contract conces-
sions, more flying hours, from the pilots and they didn't get them, 
and then they didn't have enough pilots. 
LRR: How much of a problem was it that as a Board member 
you had information that you could not communicate to your 
membership because of the "Board confidentiality" requirement? 
Bryan: There were certainly matters I couldn't communicate. For 
example, if there was going to be a new issue of stock—which there 
was in 1985 and I knew about that development a couple months 
before it happened. That's insider information, and there's no way 
in the world I could tell people there's going to be a new issue 
of stock. But that sort of thing had nothing to do with my ability 
to represent the people. 
LRR: Did being on the Board cause you to be less outspoken in 
public than you had been previously? 
Bryan: No, I think I perhaps felt that I was able to communicate 
internally, put it into the record, have an effect on the process, 
and therefore I would not need to go out publicly to try to force, 
through public exposure, reactions from the board. I was able to 
do it from within. So, while it might be viewed as a handicap, it 
was in fact an opportunity. And, I take no great pleasure in going 
out and bally-hooing things in the media just for the sake of getting 
attention. It's a tool that you can use when you have no other tool 
to use, but the fact was I think I had a better tool, a stronger tool, 
by being on the board and getting everything I needed to know 
and being able to make reports and criticisms to that board. 
LRR: How do you answer the charge that the resources going to 
building the Programs for Positive Action at Eastern could have 
been better spent addressing cross-union issues in the indus t ry-
issues like organizing, coordinated bargaining, and building a case 
for re-regulation? 
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Bryan: First, I do not believe you can say that the energies used 
for something that is very important, very valuable, could have 
been used somewhere else. I think that those kinds of activities 
(organizing, etc.) should be pursued with as much vigor as you 
can possibly pursue them. I think that having the success of a new 
approach, of higher levels of responsibility for preserving job 
security and levels of pay, would be a credential for the organizers 
to go out and use to convince non-union people that the old, 
traditional image of the union as just wanting slowdowns, job 
actions and obstructing productivity and so forth are simply not 
true in our case—that we had a different role, a mature and 
responsible role, to make us competitive in a world economy, 
instead of narrowly focusing on a specific skill or a particular craft. 
People who think that just organizing, just going out and saying 
"we want to organize you," and saying that that's good because 
we're using this energy organizing, are completely missing the 
boat. And I think that's why organized labor is down to 18% of 
the workforce today. I don't believe that organized labor is being 
progressive in their thinking, in developing the highest level of 
respect worldwide that we need if we're going to prevail. 
If I were in a position to set policy for all of organized labor, 
organized labor would have major investment banking capabilities; 
they would have a major influence over the enormous pension 
funds and the access to money and the investment of money. They 
would certainly expand their influence on the enormous wealth 
in this country, the investment and directing of that wealth. And 
they would truly pursue a corporate culture that was co-deter-
mination, which was what we were trying to develop. 
Just because our effort got beaten back, to me was very strong 
evidence that we were so successful I think it scared the hell out 
of corporate America. 
LRR: What are the prospects for the union under Texas Air and 
Frank Lorenzo? 
Bryan: I think that our position is so absolute in pursuit of putting 
this thing right, through the courts and doing it in a business-like 
way, that I wouldn't even contemplate anything to the contrary. 
As it relates to the near-term, in dealing with Texas Air Corp., I 
think that Frank Lorenzo's absolute and total contempt for 
organized labor is such that there will be no harmony or coopera-
tion from him and, therefore, none going back to him. • 
